Published in edu.philica.com
This paper examines the question of women’s epistemic exclusion and how it poses empowerment crises for them. It interrogates both implicit as well as explicit chauvinistic ascriptions of roles, behaviors, as well as emotional characterization between females and males. In view of the fact that epistemic sexist strategy for gender empowerment subsists as an aberration of social and biological categories, this study argues against epistemic sexist exclusion in human and social service as a cultural and social dysfunctions. The essay thus critiqued epistemic sexist exclusion based on the purported illogicality it elicits , in terms of equitable and sustainable empowerment of women. Hence, it seems spurious to infer that human and social relations between the sexes are unquestionably formed from considerable numbers of mysterious and multifaceted epistemic exclusion. This is because human cognitive activity cannot be reduced to the mythological ascription of human roles to imaginative ego boosting and non professional bigotry of any chauvinistic epistemological reduction.
Women's Epistemic Exclusion and the Question of Equitable and Sustainable Educational Empowerment.
IRENE OMOLOLA ADADEVOH
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY,
FACULTY OF ARTS
ADEKUNLE AJASIN UNIVERSITY
AKUNGBA, ONDO, NIGERIA.
This paper examines the question of women's epistemic exclusion and how it poses empowerment crises for them. It interrogates both implicit as well as explicit chauvinistic ascriptions of roles, behaviors, as well as emotional characterization between females and males. In view of the fact that epistemic sexist strategy for gender empowerment subsists as an aberration of social and biological categories, this study argues against epistemic sexist exclusion in human and social service as a cultural and social dysfunctions. The essay thus critiqued epistemic sexist exclusion based on the purported illogicality it elicits , in terms of equitable and sustainable educational empowerment of women. Hence, it seems spurious to infer that human and social relations between the sexes are unquestionably formed from considerable numbers of mysterious and multifaceted epistemic exclusion. This is because human cognitive activity cannot be reduced to the mythological ascription of human roles to imaginative ego boosting and non professional bigotry of any chauvinistic epistemological reduction.
Introduction: Social-Epistemological Analytic Contexts on Women's Epistemic Exclusion.
Many aspects of epistemic sexist culture demonstrate that dominant knowledge and practices of cognitive assemblages disadvantage women. The study highlights the epistemic mis-conceptions and identifies ways in which traditional, social and psychological conceptions of knowledge in sexist cultural tradition systematically disadvantage women. This study explains how sexist cultural epistemology excludes women from areas of tangible inquiry and how it denies them epistemic authority. In presenting how sexist epistemic culture denigrates feminine cognitive styles and social modes of knowledge, the study in analytically explains the irrational mythical theories against women in epistemic sexist culture that represent them as inferior, insignificant and subordinate. The point being made for the socio-epistemological deconstruction of prejudicial knower status is that the social wisdom, function and capability of the knower should affect what and how he or she knows. An individual's objective and non-partial assessment of social epistemic authority as it is often contradicted in predjudicial knower status should therefore not be the case. This means that objective epistemic authority should not be subjected to biological physiological orientation, ethnicity, kinship status, occupation, political party membership, etc. Rather, a person's capacity quotient in handling social responsibilities and not his or her prejudicial ascribed social identities, roles and relationships should be the marker of an enduring epistemological potential and position (Adadevoh 2001, 2010). The position of this study in relation to objective epistemic development is that individuals' competence should be unprejudiced, impersonal and given fair assessment by reference to their performance in social epistemic roles. As a result, problem of objectivity is vitiated when powers, duties, and role-given goals and interests are unbiased. Gender epistemic objectivity is therefore to subject a person's cognitive ability to fair social and rational functions that will not only decipher between skills but rather that will appropriate skill to roles. (Harding, 1986, Hartsock, 1996). In such objective epistemological appropriation, the claim of superiority can only be given to either the male or female person impartially. (Harding, S. and Hintikka, M. 1983) This means that norms, emotions and beliefs that pre-supposedly ascribe masculinity a privileged status or that offer partial, contingent, unstable, uncertain, ambiguous and essentially contestable account of gender cognitive relations, are not objective. (The detailed social epistemological analysis of prejudicial knower status will be elucidated on in Analytic perspective as epistemic sexist denigration of "feminine" cognitive modes of knowledge and as women's exclusion from areas of tangible inquiry and epistemic authority). The next sub section of this study will examine the prejudicial and biased ascription of superiority and dominance to masculinity in epistemic sexist construct and analyze how it creates an ethical problem revolving round the abnegation of freedom, choice and responsibility in human actions and thoughts.
Rethinking the Problem of Epistemic Leadership and Prejudicial Knower Status.
Epistemic sexist and inequitable leadership structures took place because service to society and humanity was adjudged as satisfactory by the chauvinistic bigotry lens. Okpewho (1981)implicitly captures this view where it can be inferred that the religious mythical and irrational foundations of women's epistemic exclusion is a symbolic illogicality because it neglects qualifications and more so because it argues from a androcentric metaphysical stand point while at the same time it overlooks or suppresses exceptions to legitimate social empowerment and development between the sexes. Given this, women's epistemic exclusion erroneously emanates from diverse expressions of supreme belief in the male gender, thus eternalizing man's cognitive relevance and in many of these cultural epistemological rationalism the male person is ascribed superior cognitive status in relation to the female person in significant matters pertaining to gender leadership empowerment and development.
Sowell's, (1991) view on cultural diversity and cultural consensus is a non sexist opinion and integrative mechanism needful to enhance an inclusive culture for human epistemic representation. From this, it follows that the discriminatory views of male exclusive epistemic heroism and supremacy as championed uncritically cannot be sustained because there are changing power structures in family and social life where many women play significant social epistemological roles. It then follows that the spurious religious and transcendental analysis on male cognitive superiority cannot be upheld. To give credence to this view, Diner (1973) showed how chauvinistic cognitive transcendence have inaccurately dominated social epistemic interpretations of human existence. Diner's text however envisioned a reminiscence of prehistoric cognitive civilization centered on the female social epistemic leadership roles as mother, head of family and as a deity.
To corroborate Diner's view, Davis (1971) also explains that women are more cognitively endowed than men are since they are superior to them biologically and emotionally and that the word ‘Hero' which is symbolic of one's exemplary capacity quotient was originally feminine- ‘Hera'. Davis analysis had a great impact on this study, because she exhumed a non-sexist epistemic wealth from myths that gives a genesis for rational epistemological and leadership speculations about the possibility of female cognitive power and not the exclusivity of female power. According to Bachofen (as cited by Engels 1981) since female lines were known with certainty without the fear illegitimate inheritance and usurpation of rights, women were accorded position of high respect and honor that became the foundation of family life, which incidentally is the bedrock of social cognition and epistemic authority. This view suggests as opined by Daly (1973), that the inevitability of women's epistemic exclusion cannot be sustained as a stabilizing form of ensuring social order or epistemic leadership development in terms of hierarchy of position and power structures within a society.
It is pertinent to point out that Freud (1925) gave credence to the pioneering this epistemic sexist error, when he argued in a masterpiece of male psychoanalytic and non cognitive leadership egocentrism that women are inferior to their male counterpart. He categorically maintained that woman's inferior and weaker superego made them less proficient than men did and less able in acting as caretakers of justice, rights and law. Barrett, (1993) sees this as the bedrock of women's epistemic oppression today and reiterated the urgent need to focus on distribution of power based on gender cognitive development by drawing on a form of psychoanalytic educational theory, to explain epistemic empowerment and disempowerment of the sexes. She maintained that epistemic sexist empowerment and development focus as based on Freud's repressed sexual desire leads to gender and power inadequacies. Hence, the study deconstructs these perspectives of epistemic sexist empowerment and development construct because it fallaciously portrays masculinity in absolute terms, as the invincible mythical social gender, the ultimate epistemic norm and leadership value against which "femininity" is defined theoretically and tested empirically.
Rethinking Epistemic Sexism as a Basis for Integrative Knowledge.
The need to rethink the epistemic sexist dogma of relevance draws from the empirical incidence of epistemic sexist empowerment and development analysis. Situating this against Jaggar's (1983) view which claimed that women's epistemic exclusion could be said to be a trans-historical and transnational social enthrallment culture, the fact remains that any eulogy of epistemic sexist relevance is at best debatable. This is because the epistemic sexism is often used to critically analyze the negative influence of women's epistemic exclusion from cognitive history and social institutions. Concerning this, Daly (1979), alluded to the fact that epistemic sexism gives the presupposition of an assumed status of exclusion connected with a form of social and religious cognitive dogma. This indicates that women's epistemic exclusion appeals to the popularity of religious claims on chauvinistic cognitive superiority to support conclusions like the binding function and position ascribed by God in bringing about inequality in matters pertaining to gender empowerment and development. Apart from argument from the religious consensus and popular sentiment on chauvinistic cognitive superiority, there is an another kind that appeals erroneously to inauthentic consent of humankind to support gender epistemic disparity.
Humm, (1992) and Oakley, (1972), explain that epistemic sexism supernaturally legitimizes ideas that dominate and exclude the female person by the fact that men under its construct are made more significant in all ramification of social and institutional cognitive order. Thus, women's epistemic exclusion fosters androcentric biases and theories of gender differences that legitimate irrational and sexist practices in social epistemological networks. (Audi, 1975). Exemplary critical analyses to highlight the irrational and untenable trend of legitimization of sexism in epistemic development tradition include those proffered by Fausto-Sterling (1985). Their criticism of the social, ethical and epistemological contexts of sexism take many forms. They both analyzed how the exclusion or marginalization of women under epistemic sexism impair their development and progress. For example, this paradigmatic impairment of women's human capital is evident in the failure to provide the female person with professional and competence driven skills and resources. Waring (1990) demonstrates ethically how the unskilled and incompetent woman can be disadvantaged. For him this subsists when women and other vulnerable groups' interests, are treated as less cognitively important, or expressed in contemptuous and derogatory ways. Examples include what Andersen et al, (1995) depicts as cultural developments that reinforce gender epistemic hierarchy by offering good positions, traditional sexist training and resources to men, but not women. Hays-Gilpin and Whitley (1998) explains that such disadvantages are demonstrable economically in the failures to recognize women's work as contributing to the "economy", as evident in the case of patriarchal-sexist cultural development programs that often accords women concessional epistemic participation and compensatory epistemic inclusions.
Keller (1985) and Spanier (1995) in their studies explain that many epistemic sexist disadvantages stem from the biases in working with "chauvinistic" cognitive styles, such as, centralized, hierarchical control models of causation as opposed to "feminine" contextual, interactive, and diffused models. Explaining how these economic negations have impaired epistemic development, Fausto-Sterling (1985) and Tavris (1992) researches on sex differences as based on women and men's ‘natures', explained that such distinctions based on human physiological natures reinforces sex stereotypes and sexist practices and fail to measure up to good standards of epistemic development. Bem (1993) buttresses their view when he maintained that the representation of subjective epistemic identification as dichotomous variables, have ways of impairing coordinate cognitive development between the sexes as well as eliminates other non sexist possibilities, such as androgyny, from considerations in epistemic development.
For Friedan, (1981), these cases of gender bias in women's epistemic exclusion is represented as a cause of error, or at least delay in recognizing the truth of coordinate relationships between the sexes for gender empowerment and development. In other words, women's epistemic exclusion does not distinguish the need for value-neutrality in either theoretical or practical sense because its autonomy is incorrectly influenced by masculinization of social/cultural values. Maslow's (1939), analysis of "Dominance, Personality and Social Behavior in Women", further lends good explanation to the fact that women's epistemic exclusion does not extol neutrality and impartiality about cognitive values because in its social networks, women's epistemic exclusion ultimately gives more power to men than women especially in the important realms of political, economic, personal and social power. Jaggar (1983:366-367) argues that the institutions of women's epistemic exclusion stems from an epistemological grid within which women are trapped. This means that sexist induced knowledge are often reflected in divisions, distinctions and oppositions, and it is essentially a cognitive ideology to protect sexual hierarchy. Although such protective sexual hierarchy is faultily construed as a set of institutional or institutionalized arrangements and practices that, support and reflect male dominance of the epistemic world. (Gordon, 1996:18-23).
Hart (1955) emphatically implies the various ways in which social and natural rights are eroded by epistemic sexist, inequitable, egocentric and material ambition. Spender (1985) conceptualizes epistemic sexist material presage as erosion of human and social rights, especially when it erroneously creates or operates within a framework of masculinism in which male supremacy is given an institutional character. Spender's analysis can be contextually situated against the backdrop of Ferguson's view (1991:266) in which, the important point was made that women's epistemic exclusion refers both to institutions and to discursive accounts of the world within which institutions are embedded. Mill (1965) states that at the institutional level, there is an epistemic sexist focus on male dominance within family, state, religion, education, etc. Secondly, on the level of discourse, there is a focus on how an exclusively chauvinistic conception of the world came into being and the ways that women's experiences and perspectives comes to be rendered invisible or irrelevant. Any sexist eulogies of chauvinistic supremacy according to Lloyd, (1993) are therefore "pre-theoretical assumptions in evolutionary explanations of female sexuality". It can also be inferred from Meszaros' (1986) analysis that any form of uncritical epistemological analysis of sex role stratification should be labeled as abnegation of human values. Lauretis, (1988:10) corroborates this and maintained that women's epistemic exclusion as so chaperoned by all forms of sexism against them, faultily seeks to define itself as a conjectural drift within social institutions, by attitudes that constitute the basis of women's neglect within these institutions. To buttress Lauretis' point, Grimshaw, (1986:26) and Anderson, (1983:9) both highlighted the vicious spiral of gender cognitive roles. This epistemic sexist vicious sex role stratification are rampant in policies on reproductive choice, sex discrimination in education, unequal pay in the labor market, unequal opportunities in training and promotions, violence in the home, inadequate social services for child care, abortion, lack of welfare rights, and non-opposition to discrimination in the legal and political arena.
Sexist Epistemic Ambiguities on Competence Driven Empowerment.
In another vein, the notion of epistemic sexist subordination of women stems from systemic epistemic negation of competence driven empowerment. Such epistemic negation does not question the irrationality in establishing women's epistemic exclusion.. Hean, (1994), states that supernatural epistemic negation by false speculative ostracism is pivotal to the egocentric neglect of women's contributory role within epistemic sexist strategic and significant social life.
Karam (1998) relating epistemic systemic negation of competence driven empowerment in relation to political participatory criteria for women remarked that within the political realm, women's epistemic exclusion subsists in masculinization of democratic culture, in ways that designate the psychology of motherhood as inimical to women's equal and significant participatory role in politics. This according to the study accounts as reasons for many women's political apathy and withdrawal or selective and concessional participation by some women that are acolytes of the epistemic sexist power structure. Frye, (1983) and Abati (1997) also remarked that participatory roles in epistemic sexist culture might be related to insecure, oppressive and exploitative stereotypes. Women's epistemic exclusion by this marginalization scheme, constructs a social scenario of human relations that sees women as culturally obstructed and physically coerced and constrained. This incidentally sees men as fundamentally unconstrained and creatively capable of bonding with each other, to socially and concommitantly cognitively so represent, protect or secure his erstwhile dependent domestic unit. Iglitzin, (1976) pointed out that in epistemic sexist heritage such misconception stems from the misinformed view that direct participation in social epistemic development plans and programs would 1."Unsex and degrade women, 2. Destroy domestic harmony and 3. Lead to a decline in birth rate". In line with this construct, Tavris (1986) maintained that women's epistemic exclusion strategies most often omits women's cognitive wellbeing and instead celebrates cognitive power structure construed to give more personal, political, social and economic welfare benefits to men.
There are other wide ranges of empirical accounts that illustrate the sexist negative consequence of women's epistemic exclusion. For example, epistemic sexist laws in the Nigerian context particularly disfavor the women in the areas of conferment of fundamental human rights, especially with respect to conferment of citizenship rights. More also, epistemic sexist capitalistic structure sees to it that they are cognitively dis-enfranchised at the market elections. According to reports in Women in Nigeria Documents (1992), women constitute an insignificant percentage of waged work forces while they top the wage-less. The economic problem of women's epistemic exclusion is that it does not applaud the hallmark of female economic expertise.( Reed, 1975)
According to Dancy, (1993) it is ambiguous in proper situations of wisdom and education how under epistemic sexist construct, the notion of concession can be equated with competence, because many evidential lowering of educational merit for women are not competence driven. What such concession signifies are special considerations based on indulgence, immoderation and lack of responsibility. These indulgences cannot be equated with competence, because competence on its part is meritoriously based on capability, skill, proficiency and highly fitted experience. The problem cognitive assessment by concessions, raises the question of how people who are conceded to can at the same time be expected to be competitively competent? Alternatively, if epistemic sexist concession is given to women in accordance to their competence, then it follows that women have initially been subjected to rude denials in terms of social benefits under epistemic sexist culture
In intellectual sexist instance according to Acker (1972) women are schooled to idealize chauvinistic posture in order to be classified as good and efficient intellectuals and scholars. This is presumptuous because it presents masculinism as if it contains different creative potentials and intellectual strengths. Accordingly, the point seems blurred how in many cases, deductive, analytic, atomistic, contextual, and quantitative cognitive styles are labeled chauvinistically as masculine while intuitive, synthetic, holistic, contextual and qualitative cognitive styles are labeled ‘feminine'. There is a vivid fallacy of misrepresentation in positing that it is masculine to make one's point by means of rigorous and critical argument, and feminine to make one's point by means of emotive and passive narrative.
Accordingly, Norris (1987) argued against epistemic sexist dominance in educational perspectives. Norris stated that it is because of these measures that many women continue to study in female oriented subjects, dominating teachers training, arts and humanities. While many men are predominantly concentrated in science-oriented fields, such as engineering, architecture etc. However, this disparity in educational pursuit is currently being bridged by many variations of advocacy for gender educational development devoid of sexism. Epistemic work situations according to Gamarnikow (1985), Game and Pringle (1983), and Hearn. and Parkin (1987) should not be rooted in the fallacious and sexist equivocation of gender roles with professional ones.
To elucidate more on educational misrepresentation, Adams and Laurikietis (1980) expatiated on the trap it elicits when they maintained that many work scenarios depict epistemic sexist biases that becomes professional entrapment against women. Furthermore, it often erroneously follows from these biases that women are professionally assessed by their marital status within the epistemic sexist order, in such a way that either when women are ranked as married or as single, it is sometimes seen that their marital status is a symbol of responsibility and maturity, while their single status is negatively appraised. On the other hand, most married women are ironically deprived of many employment opportunities simply by the spurious fact that the demands of their psychological motherhood statuses makes them take time off work and as such poses cognitive constraints on their effective contributions as workers. Even more bizarrely, the depiction of their single status as irresponsible and immature does not really enhance their inclusion in significant work schedule.
In line with the performance exclusion paradigm, the study maintains that it is consequently paradoxical when professional rank is consequently related to marital status by simple spurious argument that domesticity impinges on ability for professionalism. The irony of this according to the study is that marriage itself is presumed to create biological obstacles for women's professional capacity. While remaining single on its part, is also paradoxically conceived as a social stigma, which has not necessarily secured women's professional success and personal happiness. To explicate more on this professional error in epistemic sexist argument against women, Gaskell, ( 1987) and Jaggar (1975), observed that if professional social skills are accredited by training, competence and expert knowledge, then the inclusion of all is a matter of social epistemic inclusions. By social epistemology, Jaggar meant that, social skills are set up on knowledge as well as based on human exposure to diverse social cognitive opportunities. Reed, (1975) was therefore apt to note that women's epistemic predicament therefore lies in the problem of sexist cognitive restriction of the female person to domestic-economic and biological social-cognitive functions. Given these social epistemological constraints, women according to Reed, generally "sell in the informal market-place skills they normally practice in the home-child-care, domestic services, charm, companionship and sex" (Reed, 1975:21).
In non sexist epistemic context, people depend on the social and academic institution, to entrench merit, to create knowledge, educate the people and provide the learning resources necessary for a epistemic development (Jaggar, 1975). After all, equality, respect for human dignity, responsibility, hard work, freedom etc. are the underlying foundation of intelligent cognitive quotient. However, the problem of giving grants based on epistemic sexist privileges, concessions and compensation in educational or any other social pursuit, can lead to the collapse of intellectual social order. This in turn can present the danger of fostering unscholarly epistemic sexist bigotry environment, that generally promotes a feeling of unchecked and unethical epistemic sexist academic commoditization and commercialization of the other sex, un-freedom and mediocrity, or what Duderstadt calls ghost or shadows of intellectualism and professionalism (Duderstadt, 1986). To give credence to Duderstadt's view, Walkerdine, (1997) says that social epistemic roles and function ascription in the society remains problematic for the female person, when standards for assessing femininity are not accredited by ability to objectively perform. But rather such performance is seen in cognizance of epistemic sexist parameter of so called ‘sexual performance'. On another intriguing note, Bass, (1985) highlighted the need for in positive leadership and performance within and not outrageously beyond expectation. For Deal, et al (1994) to cognitively negotiate for performance beyond expectations will lead to a sordid leadership paradox. It thus follows that epistemic sexist educational standards that are not based on ability to perform is even more of a double standard paradox, because it unduly lowers educational merit on one hand and high-handedly raises it on another. When educational merits are lowered mediocrity is encouraged, and when it is unduly heightened, colossal standards are set. Both are paradoxical and subjective because raising or lowering of educational merit seems to suggest that women's aspiration for leadership roles should be based on their ability to perform beyond expectations or beneath expectations.
Theoretic and Pragmatic Consequences of Women's Epistemic Exclusion
It can be inferred from Walby's , (1990) standpoint that epistemic sexist exclusions is a holistic problem that pervades the total spheres of economy, education, law, media, family, religion, culture, and politics. Its over all pragmatic consequence can be narrowed down to variations in private and public institutional networks. Janusz and Vladimier (1995) in explains that the conceptualization of the varied consequences takes different new dimensions to safeguard people's freedom and, choices of cognitive expertise. However with respect to epistemic insights on how gender role socialization with respect to holistic analysis is multifaceted and concomitantly very problematic. This is because epistemic sexism in social institutional framework tends to be situated predominantly in defense terms, as opposed to the more viable personal and participatory connotation. This possibly is also why the Africa Research Bulletin (2000) construes all forms of sexism traditionally, in terms of the cognitive conflicts that tends to endanger the possibilities for positive empowerment for women. However, the conception of epistemic sexism needs to be broaden and made to cover all fields of knowledge acquisition and dissemination in human relationships that causes conflict. This means that outside the restrictive lenses of epistemic sexism women should be fully included in the strategies of skill demonstration for the avoidance or management of cognitive conflicts (Anderson 1995a, 1995b). Thus, according to Women's International Network News' report (1988) epistemic development as anchored on social and by extension to cognitive field of inquisition on should ensure inclusion of women by virtue of the content of the knowledge without prejudice to the status of the knower. This signifies that epistemic justification of knowledge acquisition should not be subjected to hegemonic ordering of the epistemic sexist and cognitively imposed structures. Thus, theoretical analysis of social epistemology and of epistemic development cannot be sexist oriented. The reasons for this according to Spelman, (1988) is because women's epistemic exclusion is itself a negation of an enduring process of advancing the course of epistemic development in so far as it is alienating and restrictive to a particular sex.
According to Fox-Genovese (1982) there is an urgent need to cognitively classify and place women in epistemic history and Hoff (1991) explains the problem of epistemic sexism as alienating, exclusive and restrictive. However the notion of epistemic sexism draws the error of material and monetary equivocation of the body of knowledge. In this context women's depreciation and educational negation have ways in tinkering with the economic equivocation of the reward for their social value and in many aspects of inter-subjective epistemic competitiveness. (Appelbaum and Chambliss, 1995). Gordon, (1996) buttresses this with an empowerment oriented development vision, Gordon believed that male centered social, political, economic and religious body of knowledge would have to be abolished, before true and non-prejudicial epistemic development of the female gender could be achieved. Harris, (1984) in addition to Gordon's position envisions a modality whereby the common epistemic sexist error of religious and metaphysical ‘logic' that abnegates women's epistemological justification can be vitiated.
In conclusion, women's epistemic exclusion according to this study is not logically tolerant of sexist impositions on why women are subordinate to men. This is because there is nothing whatsoever, that provides the impetus to assume that a group of people needs to cognitively dominate or be imperial to others witout due consideration of the content of their cognitive expertise. It is thus logically and epistemologically possible to imagine a world in which the reverse of epistemic sexist imagery and in which positive and complementary, or convergent cognitive relations are the cases. In other words, the theory of modality in logic or the idea of possible world situated meaningfully within the ambit of skill acquisition, justification of knowledge offers a quick rebuttal to the epistemic sexist argument. This means that norms, emotions and beliefs that pre-supposedly ascribe bias and prejudicial statuses, or a privileged concessions or that offer partial, contingent, unstable, uncertain, ambiguous and essentially contestable account of gender cognitive relations, are not objective but rather are epistemological denigration of "feminine" cognitive modes of knowledge. As such, vitiates women's inclusion within the schemes and spaces of tangible inquiry and epistemic authority
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Information about this Article
Peer-review ratings (from 2 reviews, where a score of 100 represents the ‘average’ level):
Originality = 137.50, importance = 150.00, overall quality = 150.00
This Article was published on 17th February, 2011 at 08:28:53 and has been viewed 4885 times.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 2.5 License.
The full citation for this Article is:|
Adadevoh, I. (2011). Women’s Epistemic Exclusion and the Question of Equitable and Sustainable Educational Empowerment.. PHILICA.COM Article number 227.
1 Peer review [reviewer #50699] added 17th February, 2011 at 08:56:33
The question of women’s educational exclusions is long overdue especially in relevant cognitive fields. One major concern of such exclusions is the restriction or constriant of women to lower tenure track educational pursuits. In philosophy of education there are widespread instances of such ommission such as exclusion of Beauvoir’s significant foundational incursion in the realm of existential education. The fact of outright withdrawal of women from educational pursuit in higher citadel categories is also very significant and should form a basis for critiquing thier epistemic exclusion. This article makes good write up and interesting read up in contemporary philosophy of education.
Originality: 6, Importance: 6, Overall quality: 6
2 Peer review [reviewer #45483] added 18th February, 2011 at 08:55:37
My major interest on this article subsists in its characterisation of gender educational exclusions as it affects women. I am particularly intruigued by its elucidatory discussion of sexist imagery in education and would have loved to see a detailed discussion or listing of the subject areas and fields of specific exclusions of women. And more importantly, if a statistical data representation can be given to butress the point of women’s educational exclusion.
Originality: 5, Importance: 6, Overall quality: 6